Sistema de comércio de emissões de gases de efeito estufa

Sistema de comércio de emissões gases com efeito de estufa
As Partes com compromissos ao abrigo do Protocolo de Quioto (Partes do Anexo B) aceitaram metas para limitar ou reduzir as emissões. Esses alvos são expressos como níveis de emissões permitidas, ou & ldquo; quantidades atribuídas, & rdquo; durante o período de compromisso 2008-2012. As emissões permitidas são divididas em & ldquo; quantidade atribuída unidades & rdquo; (AAUs).
O comércio de emissões, conforme estabelecido no Artigo 17 do Protocolo de Quioto, permite aos países que dispõem de unidades de emissão para poupar - as emissões permitiram que eles não fossem "usados" - para vender esse excesso de capacidade a países que estão acima de seus objetivos.
Assim, uma nova mercadoria foi criada sob a forma de reduções ou remoções de emissões. Como o dióxido de carbono é o principal gás com efeito de estufa, as pessoas falam simplesmente de comércio de carbono. O carbono agora é rastreado e comercializado como qualquer outra mercadoria. Isso é conhecido como o "mercado do carbono".
Mais do que as unidades de emissões reais podem ser negociadas e vendidas sob o esquema de comércio de emissões de Protocolo de Quioto.
As transferências e aquisições dessas unidades são rastreadas e registradas através dos sistemas de registro no âmbito do Protocolo de Quioto.
Um log de transações internacionais assegura a transferência segura de unidades de redução de emissão entre países.
A fim de abordar a preocupação de que as Partes pudessem "oversell" unidades e, subsequentemente, não conseguem cumprir os seus próprios objectivos de emissões, cada Parte é obrigada a manter uma reserva de UREs, RCE, UQAs e / ou RMUs em seu registro nacional. Esta reserva, conhecida como "reserva do período de compromisso", não deve cair abaixo de 90% do valor atribuído da Parte ou 100% de cinco vezes o inventário mais recentemente revisado, o que for mais baixo.
sobre modalidades, regras e diretrizes para o comércio de emissões de acordo com o Artigo 17 do Protocolo de Quioto mais & gt; & gt;
sobre as modalidades de contabilização das quantidades atribuídas nos termos do Artigo 7.4 do Protocolo de Quioto mais & gt; & gt;

O Sistema de Comércio de Emissões da UE (EU ETS)
O Sistema de Comércio de Emissões da UE explicou.
O sistema de comércio de emissões da UE (EU ETS) é uma pedra angular da política da UE para combater as alterações climáticas e a sua ferramenta chave para reduzir as emissões de gases com efeito de estufa de forma rentável. É o primeiro mercado de carbono do mundo e continua sendo o maior.
opera em 31 países (todos os 28 países da UE, mais a Islândia, o Liechtenstein e a Noruega) limita as emissões de mais de 11 mil instalações de energia pesada (centrais eléctricas e instalações industriais) e as companhias aéreas que operam entre esses países cobre cerca de 45% dos gases de efeito estufa da UE emissões.
Para uma visão geral detalhada, veja:
Um sistema "cap and trade".
O EU ETS trabalha no princípio do "capital e do comércio".
Um limite é fixado na quantidade total de certos gases de efeito estufa que podem ser emitidos por instalações cobertas pelo sistema. A tampa é reduzida ao longo do tempo para que as emissões totais caírem.
Dentro do limite, as empresas recebem ou compram licenças de emissão que podem trocar entre si, conforme necessário. Eles também podem comprar quantidades limitadas de créditos internacionais de projetos de poupança de emissões em todo o mundo. O limite do número total de permissões disponíveis garante que eles tenham um valor.
Depois de cada ano, uma empresa deve entregar subsídios suficientes para cobrir todas as suas emissões, caso contrário multas pesadas são impostas. Se uma empresa reduz suas emissões, ela pode manter os subsídios de reposição para cobrir suas necessidades futuras, ou então vendê-las para outra empresa que não possui subsídios.
O comércio traz flexibilidade que garante que as emissões sejam reduzidas, quando menos custa. Um preço robusto do carbono também promove o investimento em tecnologias limpas e com baixas emissões de carbono.
Principais características da fase 3 (2013-2020)
O EU ETS está agora em sua terceira fase - significativamente diferente das fases 1 e 2.
As principais mudanças são:
Um único limite de emissões a nível da UE aplica-se ao sistema anterior de capitais nacionais. O leilão é o método padrão para a alocação de licenças (em vez da alocação gratuita), e as regras de alocação harmonizadas se aplicam às licenças ainda concedidas gratuitamente. Mais setores e Os gases incluíram 300 milhões de licenças reservadas na Reserva dos Novos Participantes para financiar a implantação de tecnologias inovadoras de energia renovável e captura e armazenamento de carbono através do programa NER 300.
Sectores e gases abrangidos.
O sistema abrange os seguintes setores e gases com foco em emissões que podem ser medidas, reportadas e verificadas com um alto nível de precisão:
dióxido de carbono (CO 2) da geração de energia e geração de energia setores industriais intensivos em energia, incluindo refinarias de petróleo, siderúrgicas e produção de ferro, alumínio, metais, cimento, lima, vidro, cerâmica, celulose, papel, papelão, ácidos e produtos químicos orgânicos a granel Óxido de nitrogênio da aviação comercial (N 2 O) a partir da produção de ácidos nítrico, adípico e glioxílico e perfluorocarbonos de glioxal (PFCs) da produção de alumínio.
A participação no ETS da UE é obrigatória para as empresas desses sectores, mas.
Em alguns sectores, apenas as instalações acima de um certo tamanho estão incluídas, certas pequenas instalações podem ser excluídas se os governos implementarem medidas fiscais ou outras que reduzam suas emissões por um montante equivalente no setor de aviação, até 2016 o ETS da UE se aplica apenas aos vôos entre aeroportos localizados no Espaço Económico Europeu (EEE).
Fornecer reduções de emissões.
O ETS da UE provou que colocar um preço sobre o carbono e negociá-lo pode funcionar. As emissões das instalações no esquema estão caindo conforme previsto - em cerca de 5% em relação ao início da fase 3 (2013) (ver figuras de 2015).
Em 2020, as emissões dos setores abrangidos pelo sistema serão 21% menores do que em 2005.
Desenvolvendo o mercado do carbono.
Criado em 2005, o EU ETS é o primeiro e maior sistema internacional de comércio de emissões do mundo, representando mais de três quartos do comércio internacional de carbono.
O ETS da UE também está inspirando o desenvolvimento do comércio de emissões em outros países e regiões. A UE pretende ligar o EU ETS a outros sistemas compatíveis.
A legislação principal do EU ETS.
30/04/2014 - Versão consolidada da Directiva 2003/87 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho que estabelece um regime de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa na Comunidade e que altera a Directiva 96/61 / CE do Conselho 23/04/2009 - Directiva 2009/29 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho que altera a Directiva 2003/87 / CE de modo a melhorar e alargar o regime de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa da Comunidade 19/11/2008 - Directiva 2008/101 / CE do Conselho o Parlamento Europeu e o Conselho que altera a Directiva 2003/87 / CE, de modo a incluir actividades de aviação no âmbito do regime de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa na Comunidade 27/10/2004 - Directiva 2004/101 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do O Conselho que altera a Directiva 2003/87 / CE que estabelece um regime de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa na Comunidade, no que diz respeito aos mecanismos de projecto do Protocolo de Quioto 13/10/2003 - Directiva 2003/87 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho ncil que estabelece um regime de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa na Comunidade e que altera a Directiva 96/61 / CE do Conselho.
Relatórios do mercado de carbono.
23/11/2017 - COM (2017) 693 - Relatório sobre o funcionamento do mercado europeu do carbono 01/02/2017 - COM (2017) 48 - Relatório sobre o funcionamento do mercado europeu do carbono 18/11/2015 - COM (201) 2015) 576 - Relatório sobre o funcionamento do mercado europeu do carbono 14/11/2012 - COM (2012) 652 - O estado do mercado europeu do carbono em 2012.
Revisão do RCLE da UE para a fase 3.
04/02/2011 - Conclusões do Conselho Europeu de 4 de Fevereiro de 2011 (ver conclusões 23 e 24) 18/03/2010 - Orientações sobre a interpretação do Anexo I da Directiva EET da UE (excluindo actividades de aviação) 18/03/2010 - Orientação documento para identificar geradores de eletricidade 06/04/2009 - Comunicado de imprensa do Conselho sobre a adoção do pacote de clima e energia 12/12/2008 - Conclusões da Presidência do Conselho Europeu (11 e 12 de dezembro de 2008) 12/12/2008 - Conselho Europeu Declaração sobre a utilização das receitas de leilões 23/01/2008 - Proposta de directiva do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho que altera a Directiva 2003/87 / CE, a fim de melhorar e alargar o sistema de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa da Comunidade 23 / 01/2008 - Documento de trabalho dos serviços da Comissão - Documento de acompanhamento da Proposta de directiva do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho que altera a Directiva 2003/87 / CE, a fim de melhorar e alargar o sistema de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa da UE - Avaliação de impacto.
Implementação.
04/07/2013 - Alterado Projecto de regulamento relativo à determinação dos direitos creditórios internacionais 05/06/2013 - Projecto de regulamento relativo à determinação dos direitos creditórios internacionais 05/05/2013 Regulamento (UE) n. º 389/2013 da Comissão, de 2 de Maio de 2013, que estabelece um cadastro da União nos termos do da Directiva 2003/87 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, decisões n. ° 280/2004 / CE e 406/2009 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho e que revoga os Regulamentos (UE) n. o 920/2010 da Comissão e N. º 1193/2011 Texto relevante para efeitos do EEE 18/11/2011 - Regulamento da Comissão que estabelece um Registo da União para o período de negociação com início em 1 de Janeiro de 2013 e períodos de negociação subsequentes do regime de comércio de emissões da União nos termos da Directiva 2003/87 / CE do o Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho e a Decisão 280/2004 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho e que altera os Regulamentos (CE) n. º 2216/2004 e (UE) n. º 920/2010 - ainda não publicado no Jornal Oficial 07 / 10/2010 - Regulamento da Comissão (UE) n. º 920/2010 para um sistema de registos normalizado e seguro de acordo com a Directiva 2003/87 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho e a Decisão no 280/2004 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho - versão não incluindo as alterações introduzidas pelo Regulamento de 18 de Novembro de 2011 08/10/2008 - Regulamento (CE) n. º 994/2008 da Comissão para um sistema de registos normalizado e seguro, nos termos da Directiva 2003/87 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho e Decisão no 280/2004 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho - versão aplicável até 31 de Dezembro de 2011 26/10/2007 - Decisão do Comité Misto do EEE n. ° 146/2007 que liga o RCLE UE à Noruega, à Islândia e ao Liechtenstein 13/11 / 2006 - Decisão 2006/780 / CE da Comissão relativa à prevenção da contenção dupla de reduções das emissões de gases com efeito de estufa no âmbito do regime comunitário de comércio de licenças de emissão para as actividades de projectos no âmbito do Protocolo de Quioto nos termos da Directiva 2003/87 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho (n documentado no documento C (2006) 5362) 21/12/2004 - Versão consolidada do Regulamento (CE) n. º 2216/2004 da Comissão relativa a um sistema de registos normalizado e seguro, alterado pelo Regulamento (CE) n. º 916/2007 da Comissão, de 31 de Julho 2007, Regulamento (CE) n. º 994/2008 da Comissão, de 8 de Outubro de 2008, e Regulamento (UE) n. º 920/2010 da Comissão, de 7 de Outubro de 2010 - versão não incluída alterações introduzidas pelo Regulamento de 18 de Novembro de 2011.
Aplicação do IVA.
História legislativa da Directiva 2003/87 / CE.
Trabalho anterior à proposta da Comissão.
08/02/2000 - COM (2000) 87 - Livro Verde sobre o comércio de emissões de gases com efeito de estufa na União Europeia Mandato e resultados do Grupo de Trabalho 1 do ECCP: Mecanismos flexíveis 04/09/2001 - Resumo do Presidente da reunião da consulta das partes interessadas (com Indústria e ONGs ambientais) 19/05/1999 - COM (1999) 230 - Preparação para a implementação do Protocolo de Quioto 03/06/1998 - COM (1998) 353 - Alterações climáticas - Rumo a uma estratégia pós-Quioto da UE Âmbito do ETS da UE : 07/2007 - Instalações pequenas no sistema de comércio de licenças de emissão da UE 10/2006 - Inclusão de atividades e gases adicionais no sistema de comércio de licenças da UE Mais harmonização e maior previsibilidade: 12/2006 - A abordagem para novos operadores e fechamentos 10/2006 - Leilão das licenças de emissão de CO2 no RCLE-UE 10/2006 - Harmonização das metodologias de atribuição 12/2006 - Relatório sobre a competitividade internacional Grupo de trabalho do ECCP sobre o comércio de emissões sobre a revisão do RCLE da UE 15/06/2007 - Relatório final do 4º mee sobre a ligação com os sistemas de comércio de emissões em países terceiros 22/05/2007 - Relatório final da 3ª reunião sobre mais harmonização e previsibilidade aumentada 26/04/2007 - Relatório final da 2ª reunião sobre conformidade robusta e execução 09/03/2007 - Relatório final da 1ª reunião sobre o alcance da directiva.
Proposta da Comissão de outubro de 2001.
22/01/2002 - Documento não oficial sobre sinergias entre a proposta de comércio de emissões da CE (COM (2001) 581) e a Directiva IPPC 23/10/2001 - COM (2001) 581 - Proposta de directiva-quadro relativa ao comércio de emissões de gases com efeito de estufa dentro da Comunidade Europeia.
Reação da Comissão à leitura da proposta no Conselho e no Parlamento (incluindo a posição comum do Conselho)
18/07/2003 - COM (2003) 463 - Parecer da Comissão sobre as alterações do Parlamento Europeu à posição comum do Conselho respeitante à proposta de directiva do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho 20/06/2003 - COM (2003) 364 - Comunicação da Comissão ao Parlamento Europeu relativa à posição comum do Conselho sobre a adopção de uma directiva que estabelece um regime de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa na Comunidade e que altera a Directiva 96/61 / CE do Conselho 18/03/2003 - Posição comum (CE ) N. º 28/2003 - Posição comum do Conselho sobre a adopção de uma directiva que estabelece um regime de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa na Comunidade e que altera a Directiva 96/61 / CE do Conselho 27/11/2002 - COM (2002) 680 - Proposta alterada para uma directiva do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho que estabelece um regime de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa na Comunidade e que altera a Directiva 96/61 / CE do Conselho Faq.
Abra todas as perguntas.
Perguntas e Respostas sobre o Sistema de Comércio de Emissões revisado (dezembro de 2008)
Qual é o objetivo do comércio de emissões?
O objectivo do Sistema de Comércio de Emissões da UE (EU ETS) é ajudar os Estados-Membros da UE a cumprir os seus compromissos de limitar ou reduzir as emissões de gases com efeito de estufa de forma rentável. Permitir que as empresas participantes compram ou vendam permissões de emissão significa que os cortes de emissão podem ser alcançados ao menos custo.
O RCLE da UE é a pedra angular da estratégia da UE para lutar contra as alterações climáticas. É o primeiro sistema de comércio internacional de emissões de CO 2 no mundo e está em operação desde 2005. A partir de janeiro de 2008, aplica-se não apenas aos 27 Estados-Membros da UE, mas também aos outros três membros da Área Econômica Européia - Noruega, Islândia e Liechtenstein. Atualmente, abrange mais de 10.000 instalações nos setores de energia e industrial, que são coletivamente responsáveis ​​por cerca de metade das emissões de CO 2 da UE e 40% de suas emissões totais de gases de efeito estufa. Uma alteração à Directiva EU ETS acordada em Julho de 2008 trará o sector da aviação para o sistema a partir de 2012.
Como funciona o comércio de emissões?
O ETS da UE é um sistema de "capitalização e comércio", ou seja, indica que ele limita o nível geral de emissões permitido, mas, dentro desse limite, permite que os participantes no sistema compram e vendam as licenças conforme exigirem. Essas provisões são a "moeda" comercial comum no coração do sistema. Um subsídio dá ao titular o direito de emitir uma tonelada de CO 2 ou a quantidade equivalente de outro gás com efeito de estufa. O limite do número total de licenças cria escassez no mercado.
No primeiro e segundo período de negociação ao abrigo do regime, os Estados-Membros tiveram de elaborar planos nacionais de atribuição (NAPs) que determinassem o seu nível total de emissões de ETS e quantos subsídios de emissão cada instalação em seu país recebe. No final de cada ano, as instalações devem render subsídios equivalentes às suas emissões. As empresas que mantêm suas emissões abaixo do nível de suas licenças podem vender seus excedentes de licenças. Aqueles que enfrentam dificuldade em manter suas emissões de acordo com suas licenças têm a opção de tomar medidas para reduzir suas próprias emissões - como investir em tecnologia mais eficiente ou usar fontes de energia menos intensivas em carbono - ou comprar os subsídios extras que precisam no mercado , Ou uma combinação de ambos. Essas escolhas provavelmente serão determinadas por custos relativos. Desta forma, as emissões são reduzidas sempre que é mais rentável fazê-lo.
Há quanto tempo o EU ETS está operando?
O ETS da UE foi lançado em 1 de Janeiro de 2005. O primeiro período de negociação foi de três anos até o final de 2007 e foi uma fase de "aprendizagem por fazer" para se preparar para o segundo período de negociação crucial. O segundo período de negociação começou em 1 de Janeiro de 2008 e é executado por cinco anos até o final de 2012. A importância do segundo período de negociação decorre do facto de coincidir com o primeiro período de compromisso do Protocolo de Quioto, durante o qual a UE e outros os países industrializados devem atingir seus objetivos para limitar ou reduzir as emissões de gases de efeito estufa. Para o segundo período comercial, as emissões do ETS da UE limitaram-se a cerca de 6,5% abaixo dos níveis de 2005, a fim de garantir que a UE como um todo e os Estados-Membros individualmente cumprem os compromissos de Quioto.
Quais são as principais lições aprendidas com a experiência até agora?
O EU ETS colocou um preço sobre o carbono e provou que o comércio de emissões de gases de efeito estufa funciona. O primeiro período comercial estabeleceu com sucesso a livre negociação de licenças de emissão em toda a UE, implementou a infra-estrutura necessária e desenvolveu um mercado de carbono dinâmico. O benefício ambiental da primeira fase pode ser limitado devido à alocação excessiva de subsídios em alguns Estados-Membros e em alguns setores, devido principalmente à dependência das projeções de emissões antes que os dados de emissão verificados estejam disponíveis no âmbito do RCLE da UE. Quando a publicação de dados de emissões verificadas para 2005 destacou essa "sobreavaliação", o mercado reagiu como seria esperado pela redução do preço de mercado das licenças. A disponibilidade de dados de emissões verificadas permitiu à Comissão garantir que o limite das dotações nacionais na segunda fase se estabeleça em um nível que resulte em reduções reais de emissões.
Além de sublinhar a necessidade de dados verificados, a experiência até agora demonstrou que uma maior harmonização dentro do RCLE da UE é imperativa para garantir que a UE alcance os seus objetivos de redução de emissões pelo menos com custos e com distorções competitivas mínimas. A necessidade de mais harmonização é mais clara em relação à forma como o limite das licenças de emissão globais é definido.
Os dois primeiros períodos de negociação também mostram que métodos nacionais amplamente diferentes para alocação de licenças para instalações ameaçam uma concorrência leal no mercado interno. Além disso, é necessária uma maior harmonização, esclarecimento e aperfeiçoamento no que se refere ao alcance do sistema, ao acesso a créditos de projetos de redução de emissões fora da UE, as condições para vincular o ETS da UE aos sistemas de comércio de emissões em outros lugares e o monitoramento, verificação e requisitos de relatórios.
Quais são as principais alterações ao ETS da UE e a partir de quando serão aplicadas?
As mudanças de design acordadas serão aplicadas a partir do terceiro período de negociação, ou seja, janeiro de 2013. Enquanto os trabalhos preparatórios serão iniciados imediatamente, as regras aplicáveis ​​não serão alteradas até janeiro de 2013 para garantir a manutenção da estabilidade regulatória.
O EU ETS no terceiro período será um sistema mais eficiente, mais harmonizado e mais justo.
O aumento da eficiência é alcançado por meio de um período de negociação mais longo (8 anos em vez de 5 anos), um limite de emissões robusto e anualmente decrescente (redução de 21% em 2020 em relação a 2005) e um aumento substancial da quantidade de leilão (de menos de 4% na fase 2 para mais da metade na fase 3).
Mais uma harmonização foi acordada em muitas áreas, inclusive no que se refere à definição de limite (um limite da UE em vez dos limites nacionais nas fases 1 e 2) e as regras para a alocação livre de transição.
A equidade do sistema foi substancialmente aumentada pela mudança para as regras de atribuição gratuita da UE para as instalações industriais e pela introdução de um mecanismo de redistribuição que permite aos novos Estados-Membros licitar mais subsídios.
Como o texto final se compara à proposta inicial da Comissão?
Os objectivos de clima e energia acordados pelo Conselho Europeu da Primavera de 2007 foram mantidos e a arquitectura geral da proposta da Comissão sobre o RCLE da UE permanece intacta. Ou seja, haverá um limite máximo da UE sobre o número de licenças de emissão e este limite diminuirá anualmente ao longo de uma linha de tendência linear, que continuará para além do final do terceiro período comercial (2013-2020). A principal diferença, em comparação com a proposta, é que o leilão de licenças será gradualmente mais lento.
Quais são as principais mudanças em relação à proposta da Comissão?
Em resumo, as principais mudanças que foram feitas na proposta são as seguintes:
Alguns Estados-Membros podem beneficiar de uma derrogação facultativa e temporária da regra segundo a qual as licenças de emissão devem ser atribuídas gratuitamente a geradores de eletricidade a partir de 2013. Esta opção de derrogação está disponível para os Estados-Membros que cumpram certas condições relacionadas à interconectividade de sua eletricidade grade, participação de um único combustível fóssil na produção de eletricidade e PIB / habitação em relação à média da UE-27. Além disso, a quantidade de licenças gratuitas que um Estado-Membro pode atribuir a usinas de energia é limitada a 70% das emissões de dióxido de carbono das plantas relevantes na fase 1 e diminui nos anos subseqüentes. Além disso, a alocação gratuita na fase 3 só pode ser dada às usinas que estejam operacionais ou em construção até o final de 2008. Veja a resposta à pergunta 15 abaixo. Haverá mais detalhes na directiva sobre os critérios a serem utilizados para determinar os setores ou subsectores considerados expostos a um risco significativo de vazamento de carbono e uma data anterior à publicação da lista da Comissão desses setores (31 de dezembro 2009). Além disso, sujeito a revisão quando um acordo internacional satisfatório for alcançado, as instalações em todas as indústrias expostas receberão 100% de licenças gratuitas na medida em que usem a tecnologia mais eficiente. A alocação gratuita para a indústria é limitada à participação das emissões dessas emissões nas emissões totais em 2005 a 2007. O número total de licenças atribuídas gratuitamente às instalações nos setores da indústria diminuirá anualmente de acordo com o declínio do limite de emissões. Os Estados-Membros podem também compensar certas instalações para os custos de CO 2 repercutidos nos preços da electricidade se os custos de CO 2 puderem, de outro modo, expô-los ao risco de vazamento de carbono. A Comissão comprometeu-se a modificar as orientações comunitárias relativas aos auxílios estatais a favor do ambiente a este respeito. Veja a resposta à pergunta 15 abaixo. O nível de leilão de licenças para a indústria não exposta aumentará de forma linear, conforme proposto pela Comissão, mas, em vez de atingir 100% até 2020, atingirá 70%, com vista a atingir 100% até 2027. Conforme previsto em Na proposta da Comissão, 10% das licenças para leilão serão redistribuídas de Estados-Membros com elevado rendimento per capita para pessoas com baixo rendimento per capita, a fim de reforçar a capacidade financeira destes últimos para investir em tecnologias amigáveis ​​com o clima. Foi adicionada uma provisão para outro mecanismo redistributivo de 2% das licenças de leilão para levar em consideração os Estados-Membros que em 2005 alcançaram uma redução de pelo menos 20% nas emissões de gases de efeito estufa em relação ao ano de referência estabelecido pelo Protocolo de Quioto. A participação das receitas de leilão que os Estados-Membros recomendam utilizar para combater e adaptar-se às alterações climáticas, principalmente na UE, mas também nos países em desenvolvimento, é aumentada de 20% para 50%. O texto fornece um complemento para o nível de uso permitido proposto de créditos JI / CDM no cenário de 20% para os operadores existentes que receberam os orçamentos mais baixos para importar e usar esses créditos em relação às alocações e acesso aos créditos no período 2008-2012. Novos setores, novos participantes nos períodos 2013-2020 e 2008-2012 também poderão usar créditos. O montante total de créditos que podem ser utilizados não excederá, no entanto, 50% da redução entre 2008 e 2020. Com base em uma redução mais rigorosa das emissões no contexto de um acordo internacional satisfatório, a Comissão poderia permitir o acesso adicional às RCE e UREs para os operadores do regime comunitário. Veja a resposta à pergunta 20 abaixo. O produto do leilão de 300 milhões de licenças da reserva dos novos participantes será utilizado para apoiar até 12 projetos e projetos de demonstração de captura e armazenamento de carbono que demonstram tecnologias inovadoras de energia renovável. Uma série de condições são anexadas a este mecanismo de financiamento. Veja a resposta à pergunta 30 abaixo. A possibilidade de excluir as pequenas instalações de combustão, desde que estejam sujeitas a medidas equivalentes, tenha sido ampliada para cobrir todas as pequenas instalações, independentemente da atividade, o limite de emissão foi aumentado de 10.000 para 25.000 toneladas de CO 2 por ano e o limite de capacidade que As instalações de combustão devem ser cumpridas, além disso, foram aumentadas de 25MW para 35MW. Com esses limiares aumentados, a participação das emissões cobertas que poderiam ser excluídas do sistema de comércio de emissões torna-se significativa e, consequentemente, uma provisão foi adicionada para permitir uma redução correspondente do limite máximo da UE em subsídios.
Ainda haverá planos nacionais de alocação (NAPs)?
Não. Nos seus NAPs para os primeiros períodos de negociação (2005-2007) e segundo (2008-2012), os Estados-Membros determinaram a quantidade total de licenças a emitir - o limite - e a forma como estes seriam atribuídos às instalações em causa. Esta abordagem gerou diferenças significativas nas regras de alocação, criando um incentivo para cada Estado-Membro favorecer sua própria indústria e gerou uma grande complexidade.
A partir do terceiro período de negociação, haverá um único limite para a UE e as licenças serão alocadas com base em regras harmonizadas. Os planos de alocação nacionais não serão mais necessários.
Como o limite de emissão na fase 3 será determinado?
As regras para o cálculo do limite da UE são as seguintes:
A partir de 2013, o número total de licenças diminuirá anualmente de forma linear. O ponto de partida desta linha é a quantidade total média de licenças (limite de fase 2) a ser emitido pelos Estados Membros para o período 2008-12, ajustado para refletir o alcance ampliado do sistema a partir de 2013, bem como quaisquer pequenas instalações que o Membro Os Estados escolheram excluir. O fator linear pelo qual o montante anual deve diminuir é de 1,74% em relação ao limite da fase 2.
O ponto de partida para determinar o fator linear de 1,74% é a redução global de 20% dos gases com efeito de estufa em relação a 1990, o que equivale a uma redução de 14% em relação a 2005. No entanto, é necessária uma redução maior do ETS da UE porque é mais barato para reduzir as emissões nos setores ETS. A divisão que minimiza o custo total de redução equivale a:
uma redução de 21% nas emissões do sector ETS da UE em comparação com 2005 até 2020; uma redução de cerca de 10% em relação a 2005 para os sectores que não são abrangidos pelo RCLE da UE.
A redução de 21% em 2020 resulta em um limite de ETS em 2020 de um máximo de 1720 milhões de subsídios e implica um limite médio de fase 3 (2013 a 2020) de cerca de 1846 milhões de subsídios e uma redução de 11% em relação ao limite de fase 2.
Todos os valores absolutos indicados correspondem à cobertura no início do segundo período de negociação e, portanto, não levam em conta a aviação, que será adicionada em 2012 e outros setores que serão adicionados na fase 3.
Os valores finais dos limites de emissões anuais na fase 3 serão determinados e publicados pela Comissão até 30 de Setembro de 2010.
Como o limite de emissão para além da fase 3 será determinado?
O fator linear de 1,74% usado para determinar o limite da fase 3 continuará a ser aplicado além do final do período de negociação em 2020 e determinará o limite para o quarto período de negociação (2021 a 2028) e além. Pode ser revisto até 2025, o mais tardar. De fato, as reduções significativas de emissões de 60% a 80% em relação a 1990 serão necessárias até 2050 para atingir o objetivo estratégico de limitar o aumento da temperatura média global para não mais de 2 ° C acima dos níveis pré-industriais.
Será estabelecido um limite máximo de licenças de emissão a nível da UE para cada ano. Isso reduziria a flexibilidade para as instalações em questão?
Não, a flexibilidade para as instalações não será reduzida. Em qualquer ano, os subsídios a serem leilados e distribuídos devem ser emitidos pelas autoridades competentes até 28 de fevereiro. A última data para os operadores renderem subsídios é 30 de abril do ano seguinte ao ano em que as emissões ocorreram. Assim, os operadores recebem subsídios para o ano em curso antes de terem que entregar subsídios para cobrir suas emissões para o ano anterior. Os subsídios permanecem válidos durante todo o período de negociação e quaisquer subsídios excedentes agora podem ser "depositados" para uso em períodos de negociação subsequentes. A este respeito, nada mudará.
O sistema permanecerá com base nos períodos de negociação, mas o terceiro período de negociação durará oito anos, de 2013 a 2020, em oposição a cinco anos para a segunda fase de 2008 a 2012.
Para o segundo período de negociação, os Estados-Membros geralmente decidiram atribuir quantidades iguais iguais de subsídios para cada ano. A diminuição linear anual de 2013 corresponderá melhor às tendências de emissões esperadas ao longo do período.
Quais são os valores iniciais preliminares do ETS para o período de 2013 a 2020?
Os valores iniciais preliminares são os seguintes:
Estes valores baseiam-se no âmbito do RCLE aplicável na fase 2 (2008 a 2012) e as decisões da Comissão sobre os planos nacionais de atribuição para a fase 2, no montante de 2083 milhões de toneladas. Estes números serão ajustados por vários motivos. Em primeiro lugar, será feito o ajuste para levar em consideração as extensões do escopo na fase 2, desde que os Estados Membros comprovem e verifiquem suas emissões resultantes dessas extensões. Em segundo lugar, o ajuste será feito com relação a extensões adicionais do escopo do ETS no terceiro período de negociação. Em terceiro lugar, qualquer opt-out de pequenas instalações levará a uma redução correspondente do limite. Em quarto lugar, os números não levam em conta a inclusão da aviação, nem as emissões da Noruega, da Islândia e do Liechtenstein.
Os subsídios ainda serão alocados gratuitamente?
Sim. As instalações industriais receberão alocação livre de transição. E, nos Estados-Membros elegíveis para a derrogação facultativa, as centrais eléctricas podem, se o Estado-Membro assim o decidir, também receberem licenças gratuitas. Estima-se que pelo menos metade dos subsídios disponíveis a partir de 2013 serão leiloados.
Embora a grande maioria das licenças de emissão tenha sido atribuída gratuitamente às instalações no primeiro e segundo períodos de negociação, a Comissão propôs que o leilão de licenças de emissão se tornasse o princípio básico para a alocação. Isso porque o leilão melhor garante a eficiência, transparência e simplicidade do sistema e cria o maior incentivo para investimentos em uma economia de baixo carbono. É melhor cumprir com o princípio do "poluidor-pagador" e evita dar lucros inesperados a certos setores que passaram o custo nocional de subsídios para seus clientes, apesar de recebê-los gratuitamente.
Como as permissões serão entregues de graça?
Até 31 de Dezembro de 2010, a Comissão adoptará regras a nível da UE, que serão desenvolvidas no âmbito de um procedimento de comité ("Comitologia"). Essas regras harmonizarão completamente as dotações e, portanto, todas as empresas em toda a UE com as mesmas atividades ou atividades similares estarão sujeitas às mesmas regras. As regras garantirão, na medida do possível, que a alocação promova tecnologias eficientes em carbono. As regras adotadas estabelecem que, na medida do possível, as alocações devem basear-se nos chamados benchmarks, p. Ex. uma série de licenças por quantidade de produção histórica. Essas regras recompensam os operadores que tomaram medidas adiantadas para reduzir os gases de efeito estufa, refletem melhor o princípio do poluidor-pagador e oferecem incentivos mais fortes para reduzir as emissões, já que as alocações não dependerão mais das emissões históricas. Todas as alocações devem ser determinadas antes do início do terceiro período de negociação e não serão permitidos ajustes ex-post.
Quais instalações receberão alocações gratuitas e quais não serão? Como evitar os impactos negativos sobre a competitividade?
Tendo em conta a sua capacidade de repercutir o aumento do custo das licenças de emissão, o leilão completo é a regra a partir de 2013 para geradores de eletricidade. However, Member States who fulfil certain conditions relating to their interconnectivity or their share of fossil fuels in electricity production and GDP per capita in relation to the EU-27 average, have the option to temporarily deviate from this rule with respect to existing power plants. The auctioning rate in 2013 is to be at least 30% in relation to emissions in the first period and has to increase progressively to 100% no later than 2020. If the option is applied, the Member State has to undertake to invest in improving and upgrading of the infrastructure, in clean technologies and in diversification of their energy mix and sources of supply for an amount to the extent possible equal to the market value of the free allocation.
In other sectors, allocations for free will be phased out progressively from 2013, with Member States agreeing to start at 20% auctioning in 2013, increasing to 70% auctioning in 2020 with a view to reaching 100% in 2027. However, an exception will be made for installations in sectors that are found to be exposed to a significant risk of 'carbon leakage'. This risk could occur if the EU ETS increased production costs so much that companies decided to relocate production to areas outside the EU that are not subject to comparable emission constraints. The Commission will determine the sectors concerned by 31 December 2009. To do this, the Commission will assess inter alia whether the direct and indirect additional production costs induced by the implementation of the ETS Directive as a proportion of gross value added exceed 5% and whether the total value of its exports and imports divided by the total value of its turnover and imports exceeds 10%. If the result for either of these criteria exceeds 30%, the sector would also be considered to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage. Installations in these sectors would receive 100% of their share in the annually declining total quantity of allowances for free. The share of these industries' emissions is determined in relation to total ETS emissions in 2005 to 2007.
CO 2 costs passed on in electricity prices could also expose certain installations to the risk of carbon leakage. In order to avoid such risk, Member States may grant a compensation with respect to such costs. In the absence of an international agreement on climate change, the Commission has undertaken to modify the Community guidelines on state aid for environmental protection in this respect.
Under an international agreement which ensures that competitors in other parts of the world bear a comparable cost, the risk of carbon leakage may well be negligible. Therefore, by 30 June 2010, the Commission will carry out an in-depth assessment of the situation of energy-intensive industry and the risk of carbon leakage, in the light of the outcome of the international negotiations and also taking into account any binding sectoral agreements that may have been concluded. The report will be accompanied by any proposals considered appropriate. These could potentially include maintaining or adjusting the proportion of allowances received free of charge to industrial installations that are particularly exposed to global competition or including importers of the products concerned in the ETS.
Who will organise the auctions and how will they be carried out?
Member States will be responsible for ensuring that the allowances given to them are auctioned. Each Member State has to decide whether it wants to develop its own auctioning infrastructure and platform or whether it wants to cooperate with other Member States to develop regional or EU-wide solutions. The distribution of the auctioning rights to Member States is largely based on emissions in phase 1 of the EU ETS, but a part of the rights will be redistributed from richer Member States to poorer ones to take account of the lower GDP per head and higher prospects for growth and emissions among the latter. It is still the case that 10% of the rights to auction allowances will be redistributed from Member States with high per capita income to those with low per capita income in order to strengthen the financial capacity of the latter to invest in climate friendly technologies. However, a provision has been added for another redistributive mechanism of 2% to take into account Member States which in 2005 had achieved a reduction of at least 20% in greenhouse gas emissions compared with the reference year set by the Kyoto Protocol. Nine Member States benefit from this provision.
Any auctioning must respect the rules of the internal market and must therefore be open to any potential buyer under non-discriminatory conditions. By 30 June 2010, the Commission will adopt a Regulation (through the comitology procedure) that will provide the appropriate rules and conditions for ensuring efficient, coordinated auctions without disturbing the allowance market.
How many allowances will each Member State auction and how is this amount determined?
All allowances which are not allocated free of charge will be auctioned. A total of 88% of allowances to be auctioned by each Member State is distributed on the basis of the Member State's share of historic emissions under the EU ETS. For purposes of solidarity and growth, 12% of the total quantity is distributed in a way that takes into account GDP per capita and the achievements under the Kyoto-Protocol.
Which sectors and gases are covered as of 2013?
The ETS covers installations performing specified activities. Since the start it has covered, above certain capacity thresholds, power stations and other combustion plants, oil refineries, coke ovens, iron and steel plants and factories making cement, glass, lime, bricks, ceramics, pulp, paper and board. As for greenhouse gases, it currently only covers carbon dioxide emissions, with the exception of the Netherlands, which has opted in emissions from nitrous oxide.
As from 2013, the scope of the ETS will be extended to also include other sectors and greenhouse gases. CO 2 emissions from petrochemicals, ammonia and aluminium will be included, as will N2O emissions from the production of nitric, adipic and glyocalic acid production and perfluorocarbons from the aluminium sector. The capture, transport and geological storage of all greenhouse gas emissions will also be covered. These sectors will receive allowances free of charge according to EU-wide rules, in the same way as other industrial sectors already covered.
As of 2012, aviation will also be included in the EU ETS.
Will small installations be excluded from the scope?
A large number of installations emitting relatively low amounts of CO 2 are currently covered by the ETS and concerns have been raised over the cost-effectiveness of their inclusion. As from 2013, Member States will be allowed to remove these installations from the ETS under certain conditions. The installations concerned are those whose reported emissions were lower than 25 000 tonnes of CO 2 equivalent in each of the 3 years preceding the year of application. For combustion installations, an additional capacity threshold of 35MW applies. In addition Member States are given the possibility to exclude installations operated by hospitals. The installations may be excluded from the ETS only if they will be covered by measures that will achieve an equivalent contribution to emission reductions.
How many emission credits from third countries will be allowed?
For the second trading period, Member States allowed their operators to use significant quantities of credits generated by emission-saving projects undertaken in third countries to cover part of their emissions in the same way as they use ETS allowances. The revised Directive extends the rights to use these credits for the third trading period and allows a limited additional quantity to be used in such a way that the overall use of credits is limited to 50% of the EU-wide reductions over the period 2008-2020. For existing installations, and excluding new sectors within the scope, this will represent a total level of access of approximately 1.6 billion credits over the period 2008-2020. In practice, this means that existing operators will be able to use credits up to a minimum of 11% of their allocation during the period 2008-2012, while a top-up is foreseen for operators with the lowest sum of free allocation and allowed use of credits in the 2008-2012 period. New sectors and new entrants in the third trading period will have a guaranteed minimum access of 4.5% of their verified emissions during the period 2013-2020. For the aviation sector, the minimum access will be 1.5%. The precise percentages will be determined through comitology.
These projects must be officially recognised under the Kyoto Protocol’s Joint Implementation (JI) mechanism (covering projects carried out in countries with an emissions reduction target under the Protocol) or Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (for projects undertaken in developing countries). Credits from JI projects are known as Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) while those from CDM projects are called Certified Emission Reductions (CERs).
On the quality side only credits from project types eligible for use in the EU trading scheme during the period 2008-2012 will be accepted in the period 2013-2020. Furthermore, from 1 January 2013 measures may be applied to restrict the use of specific credits from project types. Such a quality control mechanism is needed to assure the environmental and economic integrity of future project types.
To create greater flexibility, and in the absence of an international agreement being concluded by 31 December 2009, credits could be used in accordance with agreements concluded with third countries. The use of these credits should however not increase the overall number beyond 50% of the required reductions. Such agreements would not be required for new projects that started from 2013 onwards in Least Developed Countries.
Based on a stricter emissions reduction in the context of a satisfactory international agreement , additional access to credits could be allowed, as well as the use of additional types of project credits or other mechanisms created under the international agreement. However, once an international agreement has been reached, from January 2013 onwards only credits from projects in third countries that have ratified the agreement or from additional types of project approved by the Commission will be eligible for use in the Community scheme.
Will it be possible to use credits from carbon ‘sinks’ like forests?
No. Before making its proposal, the Commission analysed the possibility of allowing credits from certain types of land use, land-use change and forestry (‘LULUCF’) projects which absorb carbon from the atmosphere. It concluded that doing so could undermine the environmental integrity of the EU ETS, for the following reasons:
LULUCF projects cannot physically deliver permanent emissions reductions. Insufficient solutions have been developed to deal with the uncertainties, non-permanence of carbon storage and potential emissions 'leakage' problems arising from such projects. The temporary and reversible nature of such activities would pose considerable risks in a company-based trading system and impose great liability risks on Member States. The inclusion of LULUCF projects in the ETS would require a quality of monitoring and reporting comparable to the monitoring and reporting of emissions from installations currently covered by the system. This is not available at present and is likely to incur costs which would substantially reduce the attractiveness of including such projects. The simplicity, transparency and predictability of the ETS would be considerably reduced. Moreover, the sheer quantity of potential credits entering the system could undermine the functioning of the carbon market unless their role were limited, in which case their potential benefits would become marginal.
The Commission, the Council and the European Parliament believe that global deforestation can be better addressed through other instruments. For example, using part of the proceeds from auctioning allowances in the EU ETS could generate additional means to invest in LULUCF activities both inside and outside the EU, and may provide a model for future expansion. In this respect the Commission has proposed to set up the Global Forest Carbon Mechanism that would be a performance-based system for financing reductions in deforestation levels in developing countries.
Besides those already mentioned, are there other credits that could be used in the revised ETS?
Sim. Projects in EU Member States which reduce greenhouse gas emissions not covered by the ETS could issue credits. These Community projects would need to be managed according to common EU provisions set up by the Commission in order to be tradable throughout the system. Such provisions would be adopted only for projects that cannot be realised through inclusion in the ETS. The provisions will seek to ensure that credits from Community projects do not result in double-counting of emission reductions nor impede other policy measures to reduce emissions not covered by the ETS, and that they are based on simple, easily administered rules.
Are there measures in place to ensure that the price of allowances won't fall sharply during the third trading period?
A stable and predictable regulatory framework is vital for market stability. The revised Directive makes the regulatory framework as predictable as possible in order to boost stability and rule out policy-induced volatility. Important elements in this respect are the determination of the cap on emissions in the Directive well in advance of the start of the trading period, a linear reduction factor for the cap on emissions which continues to apply also beyond 2020 and the extension of the trading period from 5 to 8 years. The sharp fall in the allowance price during the first trading period was due to over-allocation of allowances which could not be “banked” for use in the second trading period. For the second and subsequent trading periods, Member States are obliged to allow the banking of allowances from one period to the next and therefore the end of one trading period is not expected to have any impact on the price.
A new provision will apply as of 2013 in case of excessive price fluctuations in the allowance market. If, for more than six consecutive months, the allowance price is more than three times the average price of allowances during the two preceding years on the European market, the Commission will convene a meeting with Member States. If it is found that the price evolution does not correspond to market fundamentals, the Commission may either allow Member States to bring forward the auctioning of a part of the quantity to be auctioned, or allow them to auction up to 25% of the remaining allowances in the new entrant reserve.
The price of allowances is determined by supply and demand and reflects fundamental factors like economic growth, fuel prices, rainfall and wind (availability of renewable energy) and temperature (demand for heating and cooling) etc. A degree of uncertainty is inevitable for such factors. The markets, however, allow participants to hedge the risks that may result from changes in allowances prices.
Are there any provisions for linking the EU ETS to other emissions trading systems?
Sim. One of the key means to reduce emissions more cost-effectively is to enhance and further develop the global carbon market. The Commission sees the EU ETS as an important building block for the development of a global network of emission trading systems. Linking other national or regional cap-and-trade emissions trading systems to the EU ETS can create a bigger market, potentially lowering the aggregate cost of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The increased liquidity and reduced price volatility that this would entail would improve the functioning of markets for emission allowances. This may lead to a global network of trading systems in which participants, including legal entities, can buy emission allowances to fulfil their respective reduction commitments.
The EU is keen to work with the new US Administration to build a transatlantic and indeed global carbon market to act as the motor of a concerted international push to combat climate change.
While the original Directive allows for linking the EU ETS with other industrialised countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol, the new rules allow for linking with any country or administrative entity (such as a state or group of states under a federal system) which has established a compatible mandatory cap-and-trade system whose design elements would not undermine the environmental integrity of the EU ETS. Where such systems cap absolute emissions, there would be mutual recognition of allowances issued by them and the EU ETS.
What is a Community registry and how does it work?
Registries are standardised electronic databases ensuring the accurate accounting of the issuance, holding, transfer and cancellation of emission allowances. As a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol in its own right, the Community is also obliged to maintain a registry. This is the Community Registry, which is distinct from the registries of Member States. Allowances issued from 1 January 2013 onwards will be held in the Community registry instead of in national registries.
Will there be any changes to monitoring, reporting and verification requirements?
The Commission will adopt a new Regulation (through the comitology procedure) by 31 December 2011 governing the monitoring and reporting of emissions from the activities listed in Annex I of the Directive. A separate Regulation on the verification of emission reports and the accreditation of verifiers should specify conditions for accreditation, mutual recognition and cancellation of accreditation for verifiers, and for supervision and peer review as appropriate.
What provision will be made for new entrants into the market?
Five percent of the total quantity of allowances will be put into a reserve for new installations or airlines that enter the system after 2013 (“new entrants”). The allocations from this reserve should mirror the allocations to corresponding existing installations.
A part of the new entrant reserve, amounting to 300 million allowances, will be made available to support the investments in up to 12 demonstration projects using the carbon capture and storage technology and demonstration projects using innovative renewable energy technologies. There should be a fair geographical distribution of the projects.
In principle, any allowances remaining in the reserve shall be distributed to Member States for auctioning. The distribution key shall take into account the level to which installations in Member States have benefited from this reserve.
What has been agreed with respect to the financing of the 12 carbon capture and storage demonstration projects requested by a previous European Council?
The European Parliament's Environment Committee tabled an amendment to the EU ETS Directive requiring allowances in the new entrant reserve to be set aside in order to co-finance up to 12 demonstration projects as requested by the European Council in spring 2007. This amendment has later been extended to include also innovative renewable energy technologies that are not commercially viable yet. Projects shall be selected on the basis of objective and transparent criteria that include requirements for knowledge sharing. Support shall be given from the proceeds of these allowances via Member States and shall be complementary to substantial co-financing by the operator of the installation. No project shall receive support via this mechanism that exceeds 15% of the total number of allowances (i. e. 45 million allowances) available for this purpose. The Member State may choose to co-finance the project as well, but will in any case transfer the market value of the attributed allowances to the operator, who will not receive any allowances.
A total of 300 million allowances will therefore be set aside until 2015 for this purpose.
What is the role of an international agreement and its potential impact on EU ETS?
When an international agreement is reached, the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council assessing the nature of the measures agreed upon in the international agreement and their implications, in particular with respect to the risk of carbon leakage. On the basis of this report, the Commission shall then adopt a legislative proposal amending the present Directive as appropriate.
For the effects on the use of credits from Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism projects, please see the reply to question 20.
Quais são os próximos passos?
Member States have to bring into force the legal instruments necessary to comply with certain provisions of the revised Directive by 31 December 2009. This concerns the collection of duly substantiated and verified emissions data from installations that will only be covered by the EU ETS as from 2013, and the national lists of installations and the allocation to each one. For the remaining provisions, the national laws, regulations and administrative provisions only have to be ready by 31 December 2012.
The Commission has already started the work on implementation. For example, the collection and analysis of data for use in relation to carbon leakage is ongoing (list of sectors due end 2009). Work is also ongoing to prepare the Regulation on timing, administration and other aspects of auctioning (due by June 2010), the harmonised allocation rules (due end 2010) and the two Regulations on monitoring and reporting of emissions and verification of emissions and accreditation of verifiers (due end 2011).

Greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes: A global perspective.
An overview of rules and developments in major jurisdictions globally, including the US, Canada, Mexico, Japan, the UK and the EU.
Navigating greenhouse gas emissions schemes worldwide.
As global emissions trading systems undergo fundamental changes, understanding the policies and rules around them can alert you to opportunities as well as challenges.
The impacts of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions continue to be of great concern globally. Innovations have occurred in market-based solutions, technology development and international law, and there are 17 GHG emissions trading schemes that have been established globally, operating in 35 countries, 12 states and seven cities.
These trading schemes present a market-based approach to controlling GHG emissions and mitigating the effects of climate change by limiting the quantity of industrial discharges of GHGs, either through the allocation or purchase of emissions allowances from a central authority or the purchase of emissions credits from market participants. For example, a company that emits more GHGs than its permits allow can buy credits from others willing to sell them. GHG emissions credit units are often known as carbon credits or GHG emission-reduction credits.
With the 2013 – 2020 Kyoto Protocol compliance period coming to an end, meeting intended nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement has opened up new challenges, and the resulting changes are confronting GHG emissions trading globally. These changes include economic dynamics, which have lowered the value of emission-reduction credits and have affected the marketplace, potential political opposition to the policies underlying GHG emissions trading and the rise of cost-effective innovations in fnancing GHG emissions reductions.
This report offers readers an overview of the status of GHG emissions trading schemes in major jurisdictions globally, including the United States, Canada, Mexico, Japan, the United Kingdom and the European Union. It illustrates the current status of global GHG emissions trading systems and also offers insights into where the global GHG emissions trading system is headed, alerting readers to potential opportunities and challenges.
Estados Unidos.
Individual states are expected to take the lead in regulating greenhouse gas emissions.
United States: Greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes.
Individual states are expected to take the lead in regulating greenhouse gas emissions.
Stay current on your favorite topics.
In the US, the trading of greenhouse gas (GHG) emission-reduction credits is underway in a large group of states on the East Coast and in California. In the northeast US, New England states and a group of Mid-Atlantic states joined together to set up a carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) cap-and-trade regime that covers CO 2 emissions from power plants in those states. On the West Coast, California's broader trading regime, which covers a wide range of GHGs from a variety of California emitters, is looking to expand to markets outside of the state.
On the federal level however, signs are pointing to lighter regulation of GHG emissions. This results from a combination of factors, including the actions of the Trump administration and pending legal challenges to the federal Environmental Protection Agency’s plans for regulation of GHG emissions. Therefore, individual states—rather than the federal government—are expected to take the lead with the development of GHG emissions regulation over the next four years.
The trading of greenhouse gas emission reduction credits is underway in a large group of states on the East Coast and in California.
NEW ENGLAND, NEW YORK, MARYLAND AND DELAWARE.
The nine states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island and Vermont jointly operate a regional CO 2 cap-and-trade system known as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). This system was the frst US mandatory cap-and-trade program for GHG emissions.
The RGGI trading scheme, which became effective in 2009, applies only to CO 2 emissions from fossil fuel-fred power plants with capacities to generate 25 MWs or more in the nine RGGI states. The RGGI system is therefore narrower than some other regional GHG emissions trading systems that cover GHGs other than CO 2 and that apply to emitters other than power plants.
RGGI applies to emissions reductions within a regional framework, consistent with how the power system in the US operates. Together, the RGGI states set a cap for total emissions of CO 2 from covered power plants in the region. Each state implements the program through emissions caps in individual RGGI-participating states that are equal to shares of the region-wide cap. The RGGI cap declines over time, gradually tightening emissions limits. Covered power plants in participating states must obtain an allowance for each ton of CO 2 emitted annually (RGGI auctions allowances, rather than allocating them for free). Power plants within the region may comply by purchasing allowances at quarterly auctions, purchasing allowances from other generators within the region that have excess allowances or supporting offset projects. RGGI administered its frst auction of CO 2 allowances in 2008.
By 2020, the RGGI CO 2 cap is projected to contribute to a 45 percent reduction in the region's annual power-sector CO 2 emissions from 2005 levels. The RGGI states recently proposed changes to the program after 2020, whereby the region's CO 2 cap would decline by 2.275 million tons of CO 2 per year after 2021, resulting in a reduction in the regional CO 2 cap by 30 percent relative to 2020 levels through 2030. The RGGI states will host a public meeting on this proposal on September 25, 2017. Although Virginia is not an RGGI member, its governor recently directed environmental regulators in that state to cap power plant GHG emissions in Virginia and establish a GHG emissions trading system in the state where credits can be used in, and traded across, similar trading systems in other states. This could potentially include RGGI states. Whether Virginia establishes its trading connection with its East Coast RGGI neighbors or California's regional trading system remains to be seen. Additionally, both major political party gubernatorial candidates competing in New Jersey's upcoming election favor New Jersey's return to RGGI. New Jersey's current governor pulled the state out of the program in 2011.
CALIFORNIA.
The State of California operates one of the most active GHG trading markets in the world, covering a signifcant portion of the state's economy. California's program is second in size to the European Union's Emissions Trading System. The California cap-and-trade rules came into effect in 2013.
Following a 2015 expansion, California's GHG trading scheme applies to power plants and industrial facilities that emit 25,000 metric tons or more of Co 2 - equivalent, and fuel distributors that meet the 25,000 metric ton threshold. The covered emissions include weighted equivalent values of methane, nitrous oxide, sulfur hexafluoride, perfluorocarbons and nitrogen trifluoride, along with Co 2 . This makes the California cap-and-trade system broader than the East Coast's RGGI system because the California system covers emitters other than power plants and GHGs other than CO 2 .
Covered emitters in California must hold enough emissions allowances to cover their emissions, and are free to buy and sell allowances on the open market. Under the California program, some allowances are auctioned, while others are allocated or given away for free. Covered entities in California can also use offsets rather than allowances to cover a limited percentage of their emissions limits. The percentage of free allowances allocated to emitters has been reduced over time.
California's cap-and-trade program is one element of the state's larger climate change initiative, the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, which aims to reduce the state's GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 and to 40 percent below 1990 levels by 2030. On July 25, 2017, California Governor Jerry Brown signed into law legislation extending the state's GHG trading program through 2030. Notably, the extension law includes price ceilings and floors and new limits on the use of offsets. Furthermore, it prohibits local air districts from imposing additional limits on CO 2 emissions from facilities subject to the cap-and-trade rules.
California's GHG cap-and-trade system also recently overcame a legal challenge in court. A split panel of judges in California's Third District Court of Appeals recently upheld the program, rejected claims that the state’s auction revenues equate to an unconstitutional tax, and instead found that the costs of buying or selling emissions allowances are property rights that can be traded. Had the court found the revenues to be taxes, the system would have been invalidated because tax increases must be approved by a two-thirds majority of the state Legislature, and the program did not have that level of support when it passed. The California Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal of this decision.
California's cap-and-trade system is connected to a similar carbon reduction scheme in Québec, Canada, which is discussed in the Canada section on page 4. This connection represents the first multi-sector cap-and-trade program connection in North America. Under it, allowances can be traded across jurisdictions. Ontario plans to join the program by next year as well.
Nevertheless, some environmental non-governmental organizations oppose cross-border trading system connections because of their belief that GHG emissions reductions should occur directly at the source of the emissions, rather than outside of the jurisdiction where the source is located.
Greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes: A global perspective.
Esta publicação é fornecida para sua conveniência e não constitui um aconselhamento jurídico. Esta publicação é protegida por direitos autorais.
© 2017 White & Case LLP.
Conteúdo Relacionado.
Serviços.
Ambiente & amp; Das Alterações Climáticas.
Ontario and Québec lead the way in developing trading schemes.
Canada: Greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes.
Ontario and Québec lead the way in developing trading schemes.
Canada's federal government recently entered into an agreement with eight Canadian provinces and three Canadian territories that is likely to accelerate the development of provincial and territorial greenhouse gas (GHG) trading systems. The December 2016 Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change Framework outlines a federal benchmark for carbon pricing in Canada. Signatory jurisdictions can implement either (1) an explicit price-based system like a carbon tax or (2) a GHG cap-and-trade system similar to the Québec-California connection, as discussed on page 3. Ontario is following Québec's lead with the development of its own GHG emissions trading scheme.
The Province of Québec's GHG emissions trading scheme is more similar to the California system than it is to the RGGI cap-and-trade initiative. As a result, the Québec scheme has been harmonized with the California system since 2014.
Following an expansion in 2015, Québec's cap-and-trade system now applies to power plants, industrial facilities and fuel distributors. While fuel distributors are subject to a lower threshold, power plants and industrial facilities that emit 25,000 metric tons or more of carbon dioxide (CO 2 )-equivalent are subject to the provincial regime.
The Québec system covers the same broad suite of GHGs that the California system covers. Covered entities must surrender equivalent allowances to their emissions. Generally, power plants and fuel distributors have to buy 100 percent of their allowances at auction or on the secondary market. Allowances are auctioned jointly with California through the California Cap-and-Trade Program and the Québec Cap-and-Trade System Joint Auction of Greenhouse Gas Allowances. Certain industrial sectors subject to international competition—such as aluminum, cement, chemical, petrochemicals, mining, pulp and paper, and refning—receive some free allowances. However, this allocation of free allowances will continue to diminish over time. Offsets are allowed, subject to quantitative and qualitative limitations. Examples of Québec program offsets include landfll gas collection and destruction of ozone-depleting substances in insulating foam or used as refrigerants removed from refrigeration, freezer and air-conditioning appliances.
By 2020, Québec's system is intended to support a 20 percent provincial reduction in GHG emissions from 1990 levels.
Offsets issued by California, and any jurisdiction connected with Québec in the future, are recognized for compliance.
The Ontario Cap and Trade Program is relatively new, having only come into effect in January 2017.
The Ontario GHG emissions trading scheme applies to natural gas distributors and industrial emitters that emit 25,000 metric tons or more of CO 2 - equivalent, fuel supplies that supply 200 liters or more of petroleum products, and electricity importers who frst import electricity into Ontario for consumption in cases where generation facilities receive fuel directly from inter-provincial or international gas pipelines.
The Ontario system covers the same broad suite of GHGs that the California and Québec systems cover. Emitters must cover their emissions in each compliance period with an equivalent number of emissions credits. These credits can be obtained through provincial allocations or auctions, or through purchases in the secondary market. Credits can be traded among emitters and other market participants. Offsets can be used to help meet part of a covered entity’s emission requirements under the cap-and-trade program.
The first auction of Ontario emissions allowances was in March 2017. In the first compliance period (January 1, 2017, to December 31, 2020), most large emitters will receive most of the allowances they require free of charge. Following 2017, the number of credits issued by the province will decrease over a three-year period to support a reduction of Ontario's GHG emissions to 15 percent below 1990 levels by the end of 2020.
As discussed above, Ontario intends to connect its GHG trading scheme with the California and Québec regimes by 2018. Once this connection occurs, the three jurisdictions will hold joint auctions of emissions allowances. Emitters in any of the three jurisdictions will be able to purchase credits on the secondary market from covered entities in any of the three jurisdictions.
Greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes: A global perspective.
Esta publicação é fornecida para sua conveniência e não constitui um aconselhamento jurídico. Esta publicação é protegida por direitos autorais.
© 2017 White & Case LLP.
Conteúdo Relacionado.
Serviços.
Ambiente & amp; Das Alterações Climáticas.
Implementation of a cap-and-trade program and compliance market is expected by 2021.
Mexico: Greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes.
Implementation of a cap-and-trade program and compliance market is expected by 2021.
Stay current on your favorite topics.
In 2012, Mexico enacted the General Law on Climate Change (GCCL), which required the creation of a national registry for greenhouse gases and provided orientation to federal, state and municipal authorities toward the authority to establish a voluntary emissions trading scheme (ETS).
In 2014, the Regulations of the GCCL for the Creation and Operation of the Emissions Registry (the GCCL Regulations) were published, followed by an implementing decree in 2015, recognizing that the first step in establishing an effcient compliance market was implementing an accurate registry of emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and compounds.
The GCCL Regulations establish a reporting threshold of 25,000 tons of carbon dioxide (CO 2 )-equivalent, generated annually in all covered facilities operated by a company. Covered facilities include emitters in the energy, industrial, transport, agricultural, waste, commercial and services sectors. Although reports must be filed per facility, the sum of all covered facilities is considered for determining if reporting is required. For example, if a company has six different covered facilities emitting only 5,000 tons/CO 2 - equivalent, it must file a report for each facility, since their total emissions (30,000 tons/CO 2 - equivalent) would exceed the 25,000 tons/ CO 2 - equivalent threshold.
The governments of California, Québec and Ontario are expected to participate as observers during the pilot ETS.
The GCCL Regulations list the GHGs and compounds that must be recorded. This includes the following:
CO 2 Methane Nitrous oxide Carbon black Chlorofluorocarbons Hydrochlorofluorocarbons Hydrofluorocarbons Perfluorocarbons Sulphur hexafluoride Nitrogen trifluoride Halogenated ethers Halocarbons Mixtures of the above GHGs and compounds that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change lists as such and that Mexico's Federal Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT) may further publish.
In 2016, SEMARNAT, the Mexican Stock Exchange (BMV) and MexiCO 2 (a voluntary carbon platform of the BMV) signed an agreement to implement a voluntary pilot ETS for several major companies pertaining to the power generation, manufacturing and transport sectors. Implementation of such a pilot project is currently being discussed, and its purpose is to prepare companies to create a draft ETS regulation by 2018, which would lead to a cap-and-trade program and compliance market (expected to be implemented by 2021).
The governments of California, Québec and Ontario are expected to participate as observers during the pilot ETS, with the purpose of collaborating in the potential linkage between these ETSs. Mexico signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2015 with Québec that includes cooperation on emissions trading, and in 2016, Mexico, Québec and Ontario issued a joint declaration on carbon markets collaboration. This collaboration would be attractive for implementing emission-reduction projects with potential lower costs in Mexico, which may be recognized for compliance in these Canadian provinces, and it is already a possibility in the voluntary market of California, managed by the Climate Action Reserve, which has implemented several protocols for projects that may be implemented in Mexico.
Greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes: A global perspective.
Esta publicação é fornecida para sua conveniência e não constitui um aconselhamento jurídico. Esta publicação é protegida por direitos autorais.
© 2017 White & Case LLP.
Conteúdo Relacionado.
Serviços.
Ambiente & amp; Das Alterações Climáticas.
United Kingdom.
EU's trading scheme framework dominates, but Brexit brings uncertainty.
United Kingdom: Greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes.
EU's trading scheme framework dominates, but Brexit brings uncertainty.
Stay current on your favorite topics.
As early as 2002, the UK began preparing for international emissions trading. It initiated a pilot emissions trading scheme (UK ETS) in anticipation of its mandatory contribution toward the EU Kyoto Protocol targets.
The UK ETS was the first cross-industry cap-and-trade greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading scheme of its kind in the world. It applied to certain named installations that were given caps on emissions and allowed these installations to purchase emissions in the event of a shortfall, or sell any excess to those installations that needed them to comply with their obligations under the UK ETS. By the time the EU Emissions Trading Directive came into effect in 2003, the UK had ample experience with pricing, auctions and other mechanics of emissions trading. Today, emissions trading in the UK is predominantly refected in the EU framework, as incorporated into domestic law by the UK Climate Change Act 2008 (CCA) and the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme Regulations 2009, which have been updated for the current trading period of 2013 to 2020.
The CCA is the core UK statutory basis for climate change mitigation measures. It commits the UK to a target of lowering GHG emissions by the year 2050 to 80 percent below 1990 levels (which translates to 160 MtCO 2 - equivalent emissions). From 2008 to 2012, the UK was capped at 3,018 MtCO 2 , decreasing to 2,782 MtCO 2 between 2013 and 2017. This will further decrease to 2,544 MtCO 2 between 2018 and 2022, and it provides mechanisms by which this target can be achieved. Specifcally, it confers powers to establish trading schemes for the purposes of limiting GHG emissions and encouraging activities that reduce emissions or remove GHG from the atmosphere. In theory, therefore, the UK could participate in any, or multiple, emissions trading schemes worldwide.
In November 2015, the UK reaffirmed its commitment to mitigating climate change on the world stage as a signatory to the Paris Agreement. The UK has developed and submitted its Nationally Developed Contribution (NDC) to achieving the targets of the Paris Agreement.
The Market Stability Reserve is another mechanism introduced to solve the problem of surplus EUAs causing a disincentive to reduce GHG emissions.
What is covered.
The CCA caps the UK's total net GHG emissions each year, and national authorities issue a fixed number of emissions allowances (EUAs) that may be used or traded as required and entitle relevant installations to emit a corresponding quantity of GHG. The UK ETS applies to a range of GHGs—CO 2 methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride. Regardless of the specifc GHG, EUAs are calculated as CO 2 - equivalent emissions, so volumes of each GHG are converted to one ton of CO 2 . One EUA entitles the holder to emit one ton of GHG.
Installations that carry out "regulated activities" beyond a threshold amount must obtain a permit and either buy or be allocated EUAs under the ETS. The threshold for covered installations is thermal input in excess of 20 MWs (i. e., through the combustion of fossil fuel), or the production of certain listed substances such as ammonia or nitric acid, given that GHG is inherently released during the production of such substances.
Covered activities are listed in Annex A of the Regulatory Guidance for Installations. One thousand of the 11,000 covered installations participating in the EU ETS are in the UK. These include power stations, oil refneries, offshore platforms and industries that produce iron and steel, cement and lime, paper, glass, ceramics and chemicals.
What is required.
The "polluter pays" principle applies to environmental protection requirements in the UK. For air emissions permits, the release of GHGs is permitted so long as the "polluting" installations pay for the right to create GHG emissions; that is, installations may only carry out regulated activities up to the number of their allocated EUAs. A proportion of those EUAs are allocated for free, and others must be purchased by auction. EUAs must be used for compliance or may be traded if the installation has a surplus of them.
Given that the aim of the ETS is to progressively reduce GHG emissions, the default position is that EUAs must be acquired at auction, with concessions being made for certain sectors to continue to have a free allocation. Under the UK ETS, each year fewer EUAs are allocated for free and more must be bought at auction. In 2013, installations that received an allocation received 80 percent of it for free. In 2020, covered installations will receive only 30 percent of their EUAs for free, and by 2027 all EUAs must be purchased at auction. Auctions are conducted through an agent (ICE Futures Europe is currently the exchange appointed by the government as the auction agent).
Installations must be able to surrender EUAs corresponding to the amount of GHG they emit each year. If they have insuffcient EUAs to match their emissions, they must either cut their emissions or acquire more EUAs on the open "carbon market." If they have excess, they may save the EUAs for future accounting periods or sell them to other installations. This ensures that emissions are reduced where it costs the least to do so.
Future outlook.
The UK introduced the Carbon Price Floor in 2013 to complement the effectiveness of its emissions trading system. Since the global financial crisis in 2007/2008, industrial output in the UK markedly decreased and, as a result, many of the covered installations ended up with surplus EUAs. These surpluses caused the market price for allowances to plummet, in addition to taking the pressure off installations to shift toward reducing GHG. The Carbon Price Floor scheme, which came into effect April 1, 2013, ensures that it does not become cheaper for installations to pollute rather than improve energy effciency and cleanliness by imposing an annually increasing surcharge on top of the market price of EUAs for installations that are fossil fuel-burning power stations. By most accounts, the UK’s carbon price floor has been successful in producing cost-effective emissions reductions. By facilitating the switch from oil to gas, it has also contributed to large-scale emissions reductions (80 percent from 2012 to 2016).
The Market Stability Reserve is another mechanism introduced to solve the problem of surplus EUAs causing a disincentive to reduce GHG emissions. This mechanism, which will be in force from 2019, is designed to automatically withdraw a proportion of EUAs available on the carbon market and place them into a reserve once the number of freely available allowances reaches a certain threshold. In theory, this will increase the demand for allowances and stabilize their price. If the number of available allowances should drop below a set threshold, some allowances will be released from the reserve.
The Paris Agreement will also likely have a considerable impact on the future of emissions trading in the UK and around the world. The agreement provides for the international connection of emission trading systems to facilitate the meeting of each country’s commitment under the Agreement via so-called "internationally transferred mitigation outcomes." The Paris Agreement provides no detail, however, on how such a mechanism would be developed, and at present emissions trading around the world lacks the uniformity for the various systems to become interconnected.
Trading across borders.
The UK ETS is inextricably linked to, and indeed a branch of, the EU-wide scheme provided for in the EU ETS Directive. As the carbon market is EU-wide and there is mutual recognition of EUAs across the EU, UK ETS allowances may be freely traded by installations throughout the EU.
Having one of the biggest economies in the EU, the UK is a major player in the EU ETS both in terms of influencing policy and market activity. The EU ETS is in essence a vehicle that helps both the UK and the EU as a whole reduce their GHG emissions and meet international commitments, in particular the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. Through the 2004 Linking Directive, the EU ETS is linked to other emissions reduction schemes provided for under the Kyoto Protocol, namely Joint Implementation and the Clean Development Mechanism. Credits earned under these schemes (emission reduction units (ERUs) and certifed emission reductions (CERs) respectively) may be used in lieu of EUAs for compliance with the EU ETS.
It is unclear what the effect of Brexit will be on the UK ETS.
Effect of Brexit.
It is unclear what the effect of Brexit will be on the UK ETS given its connection to the wider EU scheme. If, upon leaving the EU, the UK chooses to leave the EU ETS but seeks continued access to the EU carbon market, this would need to be negotiated. The terms of access may be contained in a free trade agreement (should one be agreed to) with the EU.
Although Brexit's immediate effects are not known, it is predicted that for the UK ETS, the effects are not likely to be dramatic, as many of the legal bases for the UK ETS are now derived directly from domestic law. Nonetheless, new policies will be needed to ensure continued efforts at reducing GHG emissions where previous policies were mandated through the EU, and the government has declared its intention to do this. The UK's targets as part of the global transition to a low-carbon economy and to combat the effects of climate change will remain independent of the EU stance. The UK is a participant in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement in its own capacity as well as in its role as part of the EU; therefore, its obligations under these agreements are not dependent on its membership in the EU.
Through the 2008 Climate Change Act, the UK is required to establish carbon budgets to ensure progress in GHG emissions reduction and other climate change-related commitments. Although the UK's 2050 GHG reduction targets and the legislated carbon budgets (including the recent fifth carbon budget, which runs from 2028 to 2032) remain intact, going forward the UK's carbon budgets need to be adaptable to the reality of an uncertain future if the UK is to meet its global commitments. This includes addressing the prediction that one of Brexit's consequences and the uncertainty during negotiations will be an economic downturn for the UK. This may potentially lead to a reduction in GHG emissions, simply as a result of reductions in industrial output, lower energy consumption and other economic consequences. Having ratifed the Paris Agreement, the UK will need to submit its own commitments and targets for carbon reduction actions into 2050. The UK's access to the low-cost emission reduction market of the EU ETS is an important mechanism for achieving targets set by the UK. Whether Brexit means that the UK cannot continue to participate in the EU ETS after leaving the EU is an open question.
Greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes: A global perspective.
Esta publicação é fornecida para sua conveniência e não constitui um aconselhamento jurídico. Esta publicação é protegida por direitos autorais.
© 2017 White & Case LLP.
Conteúdo Relacionado.
Serviços.
Ambiente & amp; Das Alterações Climáticas.
União Européia.
The world’s biggest trading scheme sees proposals intended to stabilize the market and links to Switzerland.
European Union: Greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes.
The world's biggest trading scheme sees proposals intended to stabilize the market and links to Switzerland.
Stay current on your favorite topics.
The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is the world's first and biggest international emissions trading scheme, accounting for trading of almost 50 percent of Europe's emissions. It came into effect in 2005 and since has developed in three phases. The frst phase was the testing or "learning by doing phase" (2005 – 2007), followed by Phase II, coinciding with the Kyoto Protocol's frst compliance period of 2008 to 2012. The current and third phase started in 2013 and will end in 2020 when Phase IV will take over.
What is covered.
The EU ETS currently operates in 31 countries—the 28 EU Member States (while the UK's connection to the EU ETS post-Brexit remains to be resolved), plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. It applies to carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions from power and heat generation equal to or more than 20 MWs of capacity and energy-intensive industry sectors (including oil refineries, steel works and production of iron, aluminum, metals, cement, lime, glass, ceramics, pulp, paper, cardboard, acids and bulk organic chemicals). The EU ETS also applies to nitrous oxide from production of nitric, adipic and glyoxylic acids and glyoxal, as well as perfuorocarbons from aluminum production. All in all, approximately 11,000 energy-intensive installations, as well as intra-European Economic Area (EEA) civil aviation, are included, covering approximately 45 percent of EEA's greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
From 2012 to 2016, emissions from fights between airports located in the EEA fell within the EU ETS's scope. The EU legislature is currently considering extension of the EU ETS's coverage of intra-EEA fights for the 2017 to 2021 period. The EU Aviation Resolution sets the trajectory for all EU countries to join the International Civil Aviation Organization's Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA), which is a global market-based measure to address CO 2 emissions from international aviation as of 2021, with the goal of stabilizing CO 2 emissions at 2020 levels by requiring airlines to offset the growth of their emissions after 2020. Under CORSIA, airlines will be required to monitor emissions on all international routes and offset emissions from routes included in the scheme (e. g., airlines will be permitted to purchase eligible emission units generated by projects that reduce emissions in sectors such as renewable energy). Although the implementation mechanics for the scheme will be developed at the International Civil Aviation Organization level, to make CORSIA effective national measures will need to be developed, and ultimately enforced, at national domestic levels.
A market stability reserve will be established in 2018 to start operating in January 2019, to address the current surfeit of allowances and make the EU ETS resilient to shocks.
What is required.
The EU ETS is a "cap-and-trade" system. It works by setting limits on overall emissions from high GHG-emitting industry sectors, with the limit reduced over time. Within that limit, companies may buy and sell emission allowances as needed for their production purposes. Each allowance represents the right to emit one ton of CO 2 - equivalent emissions. The overall number of allowances issued determines the volume of emissions permitted, and in that way emissions are "capped." The idea is that the cap is reduced over time, thereby reducing emissions. In the current (third) phase of the EU ETS, the number of allowances issued is declining annually. Allowances are distributed to installations by allocation and increasingly by auction. The allowances can be freely traded on the market or between covered entities. Each year, installations must surrender allowances equivalent to the amount of CO 2 - equivalent emissions they emit. If installations produce more emissions than covered by allowances, they face signifcant financial penalties amounting to €100/tCO2 (rising with EU infation from 2013); if they produce less, they can trade the surplus allowances.
For installations to receive free allocation, they must meet the relevant sector's benchmarks. For those installations that are not at a signifcant risk of carbon leakage (i. e., where, for reasons of costs related to climate policies, businesses transfer production to other countries with fewer constraints on GHG emissions), the scheme provides that free allowances decline annually, to 30 percent of all allowances in 2020. In principle, no free allowances will be available from 2027. To safeguard the competitiveness of industries, installations in sectors and sub-sectors deemed to be exposed to a signifcant risk of carbon leakage will continue to receive a higher share of free allowances in Phase IV compared to the other industrial installations, so long as they meet the relevant sector benchmark.
The power generation sector is not eligible for free allocation, except under special conditions in a few lower-income EU countries in order to modernize their power sectors.
Future outlook.
The EU has committed under the Paris Agreement and for its 2030 Climate and Energy Policy Framework to reduce GHG emissions by at least 40 percent domestically by 2030. To accomplish this, it proposes to increase the pace of emissions cuts, address carbon leakage and fund low-carbon innovation. A market stability reserve will be established in 2018 to start operating in January 2019, to address the current surfeit of allowances and make the EU ETS resilient to shocks by introducing an adjustment to the supply of allowances that are to be auctioned. According to the EU's legislative proposal for the EU ETS (2021 to 2030), the annual rate of decline of total allowances would accelerate to 2.2 percent from the current 1.74 percent.
The proposal also aims to update sector benchmarks to refect technological progress, provide a more targeted carbon leakage classification (and develop "predictable, robust and fair rules" to address the risk of carbon leakage), and more closely align free allocation with production levels. The proposal puts in place two new funds—an innovation fund and a modernization fund—to help industry and power sectors meet the innovation and investment challenges inherent in reducing their emissions.
Linking with others.
The EU ETS is linked with the Kyoto Protocol's international emissions trading system. Emission-reduction credits generated from Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation projects could be used for EU ETS compliance (with quantitative restrictions). This was designed to cover reductions in sectors not included in the EU ETS as well as help expand market access to low-cost emissions reductions and support technology transfer. The EU ETS adopts this through the 2004 EU Linking Directive, allowing operators to use Kyoto Protocol credits for compliance with the EU ETS on a one-for-one basis.
Additionally, the EU and Switzerland have finalized technical negotiations and in principle have agreed to link their systems. However, the final conclusion of the Linking Agreement is dependent on negotiations on a broader package of issues with Switzerland. Once the agreement has entered into force, linking will result in the mutual recognition of EU and Swiss emissions allowances.
Greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes: A global perspective.
Esta publicação é fornecida para sua conveniência e não constitui um aconselhamento jurídico. Esta publicação é protegida por direitos autorais.
© 2017 White & Case LLP.
Conteúdo Relacionado.
Serviços.
Ambiente & amp; Das Alterações Climáticas.
Tokyo Metropolitan Government's and Saitama Prefecture's schemes are connected as Japan considers a national scheme.
Japan: Greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes.
Tokyo Metropolitan Government's and Saitama Prefecture's schemes are connected as Japan considers a national scheme.
Stay current on your favorite topics.
Similar in some ways to regional emissions trading schemes in the US and Canada, Japan has locally connected emissions trading regimes in the Tokyo Metropolitan Government and Saitama Prefecture. On the national level, although Japan’s Voluntary Emissions Trading Scheme has existed since 2005, after efforts to implement a mandatory national emissions trading system were postponed in December 2010, the stance of Japan’s government has been to carefully consider an emissions trading scheme, evaluating its burden on Japanese industry, associated impacts on employment, developments and effects of emissions trading schemes in other countries, and global warming countermeasures that are already implemented in Japan (e. g., voluntary actions by industry).
Emissions trading launched in April 2010, when the registry started to manage emissions trading records.
TOKYO METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT.
The Tokyo Metropolitan Government started the "Mandatory CO 2 Reduction and Emissions Trading Program" in April 2010. It requires mandatory reduction of absolute carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions and implements a cap-and-trade program by amending the Tokyo Metropolitan Environmental Security Ordinance.
What is covered.
The cap applies to large-scale facilities (buildings and factories) with a total consumption of fuels, heat and electricity of 1,500 kiloliters or larger per year in crude oil-equivalent. These facilities include large CO 2 emitters such as offce buildings and factories. The program targets only energy-related CO 2 in the frst stage; other gases will be added sequentially as necessary. The program covers approximately 1,300 facilities in Tokyo including 1,100 business facilities and 200 factories, and it covers approximately 40 percent of the total volume of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by industrial and commercial facilities in Tokyo. The program differs from that of its EU ETS and US RGGI counterparts since it also includes within its scope large-scale offce buildings.
What is required.
The program sets five-year compliance periods and targets for total emissions over each five-year period. The first compliance period covered fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2014; the second compliance period covers fiscal year 2015 to fiscal year 2019. Covered facilities in the program must reduce energy-related CO 2 emissions (i. e., consumption of fuels, heat and electricity).
During the first compliance period, 8 percent reductions were required for business facilities such as offce buildings, and 6 percent reductions were required for industrial facilities such as factories. The percentage of reductions are calculated using base-year emissions, which are the average emissions of three consecutive fiscal years selected between fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2007. Total emissions of the covered facilities for the fiscal year 2014 were reduced by 25 percent from base-year emissions, amounting to a 14 million ton reduction in the frst compliance period. For the second compliance period, the target has increased to a 17 percent reduction for business facilities and a 15 percent reduction for industrial facilities. Owners of covered facilities must report the previous fiscal year's emissions to the Tokyo Metropolitan Government by the end of November every year.
Emissions trading launched in April 2010, when the registry started to manage emissions trading records. A filing must be made with the registry when acquiring, transferring or using excess reduction or offset credits to fulfill the reduction obligation. Five types of credits—Excess Credits (excess emission reductions), Small and Midsize Facility Credits (emission reductions from small and midsize facilities in Tokyo), Renewable Energy Credits, Outside Tokyo Credits (emission reductions outside Tokyo area) and Saitama Credits—are under the cap-and-trade program. Of those credits, Small and Midsize Facility Credits, Renewable Energy Credits, Outside Tokyo Credits and Saitama Credits are offset credits, which may be used to fulfill obligations under the program.
Future outlook.
Looking forward to the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games and beyond, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government set up a new Environmental Master Plan in 2016 that showcases the environmental policies to be implemented by 2030, which include the target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 30 percent below 2000 levels.
Conexões.
Tokyo Metropolitan Government and Saitama Prefecture signed the agreement to connect their emissions trading programs in September 2010. Since April 2011, Tokyo Metropolitan Government’s cap-and-trade system has been connected to a similar reduction scheme in Saitama Prefecture. Excess Credits and Small and Midsize Facilities Credits issued by Saitama Prefecture are tradable under the Tokyo system.
SAITAMA PREFECTURE.
One year after Tokyo, Saitama Prefecture established and started the "Target-Setting Emissions Trading Program," in which the prefecture sets reduction targets of covered facilities and allows them to trade allowances, in accordance with the Saitama Prefecture Global Warming Strategy Promoting Ordinance of April 2011.
What is covered.
The coverage is basically the same as Tokyo's. It covers large-scale facilities (buildings and factories) with total consumption of fuels, heat and electricity of 1,500 kiloliters or more per year in crude oil-equivalent. Approximately 600 facilities are covered.
What is required.
The frst compliance period was a four-year term starting from fiscal year 2011 to fiscal year 2014 and now is in the middle of the fve-year second compliance period starting from fiscal year 2015 to fiscal year 2019. For the frst compliance period, an 8 percent reduction below base-year emissions was required for business facilities such as offce buildings and commercial facilities and a 6 percent reduction was required for industrial facilities such as factories. As for the second compliance period, the target has increased to 15 percent for offce buildings and commercial facilities and 13 percent for factories. Unlike the Tokyo scheme, there is no penalty for unachieved facilities.
Six types of credits—Excess Credits (excess emission reductions), Small and Midsize Facility Credits (emission reductions from small and midsize facilities in Saitama), Renewable Energy Credits, Outside Saitama Credits (emission reductions outside Saitama Prefecture), Forest Absorption Credits (credits from forests inside the Saitama Prefecture) and Tokyo Credits—are tradable under the cap-and-trade program. The five credits other than Excess Credits are offset credits to be used to fulfill reduction obligations under the program.
Future outlook.
Saitama Prefecture revised its global warming strategy action plan—Stop Global Warming Saitama Navigation 2050—in 2015 and set a target greenhouse gas reduction of 21 percent below 2005 levels by 2020.
Conexões.
Saitama's cap-and-trade program is connected to the Tokyo Metropolitan Government's program. Excess Credits from Tokyo Metropolitan Government's emissions trading system and Small and Midsize Facility Credits issued by Tokyo Metropolitan Government are offcially eligible as offset credits.
KYOTO PREFECTURE.
The Kyoto Prefecture has a "Kyoto Verifed Emission Reduction" scheme managed by the "Kyoto CO 2 Reduction Bank," whose members are Kyoto Prefecture, Kyoto City, Kyoto Chamber of Commerce and Industry, The Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc., Osaka Gas, Co., Ltd., and four other industry associations and one environmental non-proft organization. It started in October 2011 and offers a unique credit system and emissions trading system. However, it does not impose any reduction obligation on facilities in Kyoto, like Tokyo, or set targeted reduction percentages on facilities in Kyoto, like Saitama, although the Kyoto Prefecture does have a target of 25 percent reduction below fiscal year 1990 levels by the fiscal year 2020.
Greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes: A global perspective.
Esta publicação é fornecida para sua conveniência e não constitui um aconselhamento jurídico. Esta publicação é protegida por direitos autorais.
© 2017 White & Case LLP.
Conteúdo Relacionado.
Serviços.
Ambiente & amp; Das Alterações Climáticas.
The global future.
Regional trading systems are expected to expand and increase their connections with one another.
The global future.
Regional trading systems are expected to expand and increase their connections with one another.
Carbon pricing and trading regimes are developing regionally in a bottom-up approach, rather than through a global top-down approach as some may have anticipated. As a result of this approach, regional trading programs are expected to expand in the coming years. For example, as the Canadian Province of Ontario intends to connect its emerging greenhouse gas (GHG) trading scheme with the California and Québec regimes by 2018, in the US, Oregon and Washington State are reportedly considering similar action.
However, the lack of an overarching global trading system leaves regional systems and those entities regulated by those systems in a slightly precarious position, as demonstrated by the litigation surrounding California's regional trading system. Other regional programs, such as the Australian emissions trading system, have already been disbanded due to political changes in the region.
The force of international cooperation, even in the form of "soft law" should not be underestimated though. With COP23 coming up in November 2017, those who see emissions trading as a potential solution for carbon reduction will be eager to see the development of rules and procedures for international carbon trading.
Regulated businesses in the industrial and electricity sectors developing or acquiring power generation and other regulated stationary sources that have or are developing carbon pricing and/or trading regimes should understand the scope and limitations of emissions trading. Carbon trading systems may present operators and acquirers of regulated facilities with unique local compliance obligations, along with potential opportunities to take advantage of connections between different regional systems.
Going forward, as regional trading markets emerge, disband, change and connect with other regions, it will be important for market participants to remain aware of the legal and political developments and opportunities surrounding these issues as they develop, finance, acquire, sell and operate regulated emissions sources.
Greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes: A global perspective.
Esta publicação é fornecida para sua conveniência e não constitui um aconselhamento jurídico. Esta publicação é protegida por direitos autorais.

Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading in U. S. States.
Observations and Lessons from the OTC NOx Budget Program.
Reviews the performance of a multi-state emissions trading program for nitrogen oxides (NOx), implemented by states in the Ozone Transport Commission. Based on this review, recommendations are made for multi-state emissions trading for greenhouse gases.
Sumário executivo.
A number of U. S. states are considering market-based policies to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs). The experience gained from emissions trading for sulfur dioxide (SO2) and oxides of nitrogen (NOx) offers a useful body of information and data to draw on to design a GHG emissions trading system. This report examines NOx trading under the Ozone Transport Commission (OTC) NOx Budget Program, which resulted principally from the leadership, decisions, and actions by a group of states, ultimately becoming the first multilateral cap-and-trade system for emissions of air pollutants.
The OTC NOx Budget Program proved to be effective on economic, environmental, and administrative grounds. From 1999 to 2002, annual emissions were significantly reduced, and the program had no discernable effect on the region’s economic vitality. Beginning in 2003, the OTC NOx Budget Program was incorporated into a larger federal system with similar features. That is, the successful state-based program facilitated the adoption of broader emissions control. Critical to this development was the leadership and innovation by the states, which provided valuable information, data, and a set of committed stakeholders.
For GHG emissions, various aspects of the problem make it well suited to a market-based approach that can spur innovation among a wide variety of sources and sectors. Though there is presently little federal prompting for GHG emissions reductions, the experience with NOx trading should provide confidence for states to take the initiative. States can start with GHG emissions controls, gain experience, and lead the near-term innovation in emissions control technologies and strategies. Over time, this may facilitate broader control at a national scale commensurate with the reductions required in global emissions.